Case A-34: A Return to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal?

Reports last week that Iran has brought a case against the United States, in The Hague, might not come as a surprise. 

There are currently two cases between the two states before the International Court of Justice: Certain Iranian Assets; and Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights. 

Moreover, as one commentator has remarked, international courts are, today, being asked to adjudicate on conflicts in “real time”. Given their ongoing conflict, the idea that Iran might try to bring proceedings against the United States might seem par for the course.

Iran’s latest action, however, comes not in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Peace Palace, but instead in the less well known (though really quite significant) Iran - United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT).

The Claims Tribunal

The IUSCT was established pursuant to the Algiers Accords of 1981 as part of the resolution of the Iran hostage crisis (1979 – 1981) following the Iranian Islamic Revolution. 

The Accords are a series of declarations by the respective states, including a General Declaration and a Claims Settlement Declaration, the latter of which establishes an arbitral tribunal, the IUSCT, to resolve certain claims. The Tribunal has nine members, three Iran-appointed, three US-appointed, and three that are not directly appointed by the two states, but by the other arbitrators. It provides a forum for the resolution of certain claims between Iran and the US and between their respective nationals and the states.

That Iran would, forty years later, bring a new case to the IUSCT is, in part, attributable to the now more limited prospects for recourse to the ICJ. Because of the Treaty of Amity case before the World Court, the (first) Trump Administration decided in 2018 to withdraw from the 1955 Treaty which provided a basis for that case.

The IUSCT is lesser known but of great significance in international law. It has been credited with extensive contributions to the development of international dispute settlement, not least because of its early use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and its production of a long series of decisions on the operation of those rules.

In substance much of the tribunal’s work has come to an end. The claims of nationals (i.e. those brought by a national of one of the two states against the other state) have all been resolved. The cases which remain pending are two kinds of inter-State cases known as “B” Cases and “A” Cases:

• “B” Cases are “official claims of the United States and Iran against each other arising out of [some] contractual arrangements between them” (Claims Settlement Declaration, Article II(2));
• “A” Cases relate to the interpretation or performance of the General Declaration; or the interpretation or application of the Claims Settlement Declaration. While there have been thousands of claims of nationals, “A” Cases are more rare, as shown by the fact that Iran’s recent claim is reportedly registered as A-34.

It is the “B” Cases, in particular, which are the majority of the outstanding work of the Tribunal. One former Judge of the Tribunal, Charles N. Brower (US), wrote in 2023 that it might well be time for a “one and done” settlement of these cases, to conclude the decades old work. Still, the Tribunal endures, and the cases remain pending.

Case A-34

It is against this background that Iran has reportedly registered Case A-34 because of US military operations since early 2025. The case was, in fact, foreshadowed by an EJIL Talk! analysis last year. Professor Andreas Zimmerman detailed how, in light of the US military operation, ‘Midnight Hammer’, Iran might consider bringing an “A” Case against the United States. 

That, it appears, is what has now happened. At the time of writing there are limited details of the claim in the public domain. But the fact that the Tribunal may have a new case on its docket brings one of The Hague’s lesser known instructions back into the public eye.

No Deadline for “A” Cases

Some recent reports claim that such a case may be out of time. 

This suggests a mis-reading of the Accords. Claims by nationals are subject to Article III(4) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, which required cases to be filed no more than a year after the entry into force of the agreement, or six months after the appointment of the President of the Tribunal. In practical terms this means that the deadline for most claims passed on 19 January 1982.

“A” Cases, however, may be brought at any time while the Tribunal is still in operation. This, of course, makes sense. “A” Cases relate to the interpretation and performance of the Algiers Accords themselves (rather than the activities which gave rise to the agreement of the Accords and the creation of the Tribunal). 

It is entirely possible for them to continue to arise while the Tribunal remains operative and the Accords continue in force. 

The Tribunal’s Jurisdiction

If the case is not subject to a time-bar the second question is whether it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This is, as Professor Zimmerman’s analysis last year indicates, a more complex question.

The “General Declaration” of the Algiers Accords is sweeping in its terms. For example, Paragraph 1 provides:

“The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs.”

It is this clause upon which Iran is said to rely in Case A-34 – to challenge the international lawfulness of US military operations in and against its state.

Case A-34 would not be the first to rely on Paragraph 1. For example, in 1996 Iran brought Case A-30 before the Tribunal. It is still pending. 

Case A-30 claims that US economic sanctions, and certain alleged covert operations (in the 1990s), constitute violations of Paragraphs 1 and 10 of the General Declaration (Article 10 relates to US trade sanctions).

The United States Statement of Defence in Case A-30 gives some insight into how the US may respond in proceedings in relation to more recent military operations.

The US Statement denied Iran’s claim and made arguments about what it termed Iran’s “hostile international activities and terrorist acts” (p. 13). These activities were said to encompass things as wide-ranging as the fatwa against novelist Salman Rushdie (p. 22) to attempts to overthrow the Government of Bahrain (p. 25).

In terms of jurisdiction, the United States argued that allegations related to the interpretation or performance of paragraphs 1 and 10, and General Principle A, are the only ones over which the Tribunal could have jurisdiction (p. 38). Claims arising from the 1955 Treaty of Amity, for example, would not fall within jurisdiction (and could not, of course, arise in relation to Case A-34, given the subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty).

However, the United States also argued that:

“contrary to Iran’s allegations, Paragraph 1 of the General Declaration did not create legal obligations or a binding legal standard under which the Tribunal is to evaluate U.S. national security policy and action. Rather, Paragraph 1 is a general political commitment by the United States confirming that its pre-hostage crisis policy towards Iran would continue” (p. 40).

The United States points to the absence of “language of specific obligation” (p. 42), the absence of “specified standards” (p. 43), the object and purpose of the Accords (p. 43), the subsequent practice of the parties (p. 44), and relies upon the drafting negotiations (pp. 45-48).

It seems likely that, when the United States responds to Case A-34, similar arguments will be deployed. Moreover, given that Case A-30 has not yet been resolved, resolution of that claim on this point may well indicate the likely outcome of the more recent claim.

The Case on the Merits

The full details of Case A-34 are not in the public domain. However, it seems likely, again, that insofar as they relate to recent (i.e. 2025 and perhaps 2026) United States military operations, the Statement of Defence on Case A-30 may well foreshadow the United States response.

On the merits of Iran’s claim in Case A-30, the Statement of Defence places significant weight on Paragraph 1 of the General Declaration being related only to Iran’s internal affairs (pp. 51-57). It therefore sought to portray the impugned United States activities as being related, effectively, to international peace and security, and not Iran’s internal affairs.

Again, it seems likely that similar arguments may be used in relation to the more recent (2025 – 2026) military activities: that they relation to international peace and security and not Iran’s internal affairs. A challenge, though, will be that however plausible such an argument may be in relation to steps taken to promote nuclear non-proliferation, it is likely to be more difficult if any activities are said, for example, to pursue “regime change”.

Moreover, in Case A-30, the United States was replying to claims of covert operations, which raise challenges of proof for Iran (see, e.g., pp. 59-68). The recently-reported claim, on the other hand, relates to military operations that have been much more overt, and about which there are extensive statements in the public domain (see, e.g., here). If the Tribunal reaches the merits of Case A-34, the work to meet to burden of proof is likely to be significantly different than in Case A-30, reflecting the very public nature of the current conflict.

Some General Principles

Finally, in Case A-34, as with Case A-30, the United States may fall back on some general principles of law. In particular, in the latter case, it has relied on “nullus commodum capere de sua injuria propria” (no one may take advantage of their own wrong) and “ex delicto non oritur action” (no action arises from a dishonourable cause).

In Case A-30, the argument amounts to a claim that Iran’s international wrong-doing should prompt the Tribunal to deny its claim in the immediate case (pp. 81-85). Again, it seems likely that similar responses will be made in Case A-34, given the way in which the current conflict is being cast by the United States.

Prospects & Impact

The Tribunal is working its way through the inter-state cases in order. Given that Case A-30, which was brought 30 years ago, remains pending, it is unlikely that the Tribunal will reach Case A-34 any time soon.

The immediate impact of the filing, therefore, is more likely to be political and diplomatic rather than strictly legal (this is notwithstanding any claim there is for interim measures which, as with the substantive claim, may well take years to be heard).

This being so, Case A-34 may not attract quite the same public attention as more recent proceedings in the Peace Palace, which have seen consideration of requests for interim measures, and orders for such measures.

However, it has brought back into the spotlight one of the pioneering institutions of international arbitration, at a time when the rules-based international order is under significant strain.