Axel Rudakubana and the Southport stabbings: The obsession with redefining terrorism and extremism is not the answer

Introduction and Summary

Three days ago, the head of the Prevent counter-terrorism scheme left his role following a review into failings that led to the Southport stabbings on 29 July 2024.

On 23 January 2025, Axel Rudakubana (“Axel”) was sentenced for offences of murder, attempted murder, possession of a bladed article, production of a biological toxin (ricin), and possession of a terrorist document. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 52 years. He is “highly likely” to spend the remainder of his life in prison. He did not receive a whole life order, only because the law does not permit such a sentence for those aged under 18 at the time of an offence.

This article sets out, (i) the background to the case, (ii) information that has since transpired about Axel which was not within the sentencing remarks, and (iii) important areas of focus for the public inquiry that has been announced. 

Society has an ethical and legal duty to safeguard children. All of the children in the Southport attack on 29 July 2024 were failed. Here, I argue that the obsession with redefining the scope of concepts such as “terrorism” and “extremism” is unlikely to be helpful in preventing future similar attacks. To address the risk posed by similar cases, two key issues should be considered by any public inquiry:

1. First, a move away from preconceptions about “ideology”, rooted in policing of communities rather than risk of harm to the public.
2. Second, accountability for internet service providers and social media platforms that proliferate online content which glorifies violence and is routinely accessed by children.

The Southport stabbings

Axel was born in Cardiff on 7 August 2006.

On 13 July 2024, aged 17 years old, he purchased a large knife. On 29 July, he travelled to the Hart Space on Hart Street, Southport. He targeted a dance workshop for young girls, mostly aged 6 to 11 years old. There were 26 children at the workshop. Within 15 minutes, he killed three of those girls, and attempted to kill eight more. He attempted to kill two adults who tried to stop him.

The girls who were killed were aged 6, 7, and 9. Elise, who was 7 years old, suffered 85 sharp force injuries to her body. Bebe, who was 6 years old, suffered at least 122 sharp force injuries to her body. The children who survived suffered between one or two to 32 stab wounds. 

Following his arrest, Axel made unsolicited comments cited by the sentencing judge, including, “I’m glad to see those kids are dead, it makes me happy” and “It’s a good thing those children are dead.”

Axel’s home was searched. In his sentencing remarks, the judge later noted files on Axel’s computer that "proved he had a long-standing preoccupation with violent killing and genocide.” In particular, the judge noted the presence of an Al-Qaeda training manual, providing instructions on methods of killing with a knife. Axel had spent hours online viewing videos and images related to violence, against any and all faiths or people.

On 23 January 2025, Axel was sentenced. In his sentencing remarks, the judge highlighted:

1. It was “difficult to comprehend why” this act of violence was done.
2. He described it as, “evil; who could dispute it? On any view, it was at least the most extreme, shocking and exceptionally serious crime.”
3. On the evidence, it was established Axel had an interest in attempting to kill as many people as he could. He had, for this purpose, investigated the production of ricin. 
4. The only reason this was not considered an act of terrorism was because “there is no evidence that Rudakubana’s purpose was to advance a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”

The Prevent referrals

Axel and his family were described as a “normal” family by neighbours. He was the son of evangelical Christians, and had in the past showed a passion for acting. In 2018, at 12 years old, he played Doctor Who in a BBC Children in Need advert. He was reported to have been “on the books of a talent agency at the age of 11.”

By April 2019, Axel had been named a victim of bullying. Serious concerns were first raised about Axel on 17 October 2019, when he was excluded from school for having a knife. He admitted to having brought a knife to school on ten separate occasions.

On 15 November 2019, Axel searched for school shootings during an ICT lesson. He was also described as having an obsession with searching for information on the internet linked to violence.

On 3 December 2019, Axel was overheard speaking to other pupils about watching videos of graphic violence online.

In early December 2019, following his exclusion, Axel took a knife and hockey stick to School. He assaulted another pupil, who he said had bullied him. He was later convicted in relation to this incident for possession of a knife, assault, and possession of an offensive weapon (the hockey stick). He was only 13 years old.

A first Prevent referral was accordingly made by Axel’s school on 5 December 2019. The referral specifically referred to the risk features that Axel had carried a knife, and searched the internet for mass school shootings. Axel was noted to be “extremely vulnerable.” A Prevent log recorded that he had at the time stated, “he was intending to hit the victim with the hockey stick and finish him off with the knife.” Despite this, the case was closed by Prevent on 31 January 2020.

A second Prevent referral was made by Axel’s School on 1 February 2021. A fellow pupil had shown teachers social media posts online by Axel, and described him as being “radicalised.” The social media posts were not considered “CT/DE relevant.” The case was swiftly closed on 17 February 2021. Prevent had come to the view the referral did not reach the threshold of “extremist” ideology.

A third referral was made by Axel’s school on 26 April 2021, due to suspicious internet searches during a lesson. This, also, was closed on 10 May 2021.

Separately, police received at least five calls from Axel’s home address, between October 2019 and May 2022. This related to concerns about Axel’s behaviour. Axel had also reported being subjected to racial bullying, including to Childline, a counselling service for young people.

The fallout

On 21 January 2025, the Home Secretary announced the Independent Prevent Commissioner had been invited to “conduct a thorough review of the Prevent history in the Southport case to identify what changes are needed to make sure serious cases are not missed, particularly where there is mixed and unclear ideology.”

On 23 January 2025, the Senior National Coordinator for Prevent within Counter-Terrorism Policing acknowledged Axel’s missed opportunities with Prevent. She noted that, despite significant efforts to attempt to understand the reason for the attack, including the review of thousands of digital files, intelligence gathering, and witness interviews, counter-terrorism police “have not found evidence that explains why [Axel] chose to attack those children or that event.” It is unclear whether counter-terrorism police have considered that Axel’s excessive engagement with violent content online, combined with his young age and particular vulnerabilities, is the reason “why” he was ultimately driven to commit this act of violence. Further, it is unclear why a reason beyond this, which seeks to fit a fixed preconception of “ideology”, is necessary to understand the risk posed by the circumstances of this case.

On 5 February 2025, the Prevent Learning Review published a review to examine Prevent involvement with Axel prior to the 29 July attack, and any immediate learning points. This noted that:

1. Axel had at one point had a hit list of people who had bullied him.
2. His ideology had been repeatedly documented as unclear, despite obvious interests in violence, and this was used as a reason for inaction within Prevent.
3. On review, there had in fact been sufficient information to refer Axel to Channel at an early stage for appropriate multi-agency support. However, Prevent’s “emphasis on ideology created a gap where a highly vulnerable individual, whose vulnerabilities may have also made him highly susceptible, has been closed to Prevent without consideration for support through Channel.”
4. The Review concluded, “There may have been an over-emphasis on the presence of ideology to the detriment of considering AMR’s susceptibility.” The Review criticised focus on ideology, even though there had been a high level of compliance with Prevent policy.

Lastly, the Government has announced a public inquiry into the Southport stabbings.

In announcing the inquiry, the Home Secretary noted that Axel, “was referred 3 times to Prevent between December 2019 and April 2021, when aged 13 and 14. Between October 2019 and May 2022, Lancashire police responded to 5 calls from his home address about his behaviour. He was referred repeatedly to the multi-agency safeguarding hub. He had contact with Children’s Social Care, the Early Help Service, Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services. He was convicted of a violent assault against another child at school and was referred to the local Youth Offending Team. He was excluded from one school, he had long periods of absence from another. All those agencies had contact with him. Yet between them they completely failed to identify the terrible danger that he posed.  How did he fall through so many gaps?”

The inquiry has not yet finalised its terms of reference. It is intended to consider the “wider challenge of rising youth violence and extremism”, with a focus on Prevent, knife crime, and online extremism. In this respect, the Home Secretary identified that:

1. There has been a threefold increase in under 18s investigated for involvement in terrorism in just 3 years;
2. At the same time, there has been an increase in referrals to Prevent for teenagers, in relation to concerns around serious violence; and
3. Five Eyes counter-terror partners “have warned about growing radicalisation of minors, happening as so many of our children and teenagers are being exposed to ever more disturbing materials online. An online ecosystem that is radicalising our children while safety measures are whittled away.”

Important issues for the public inquiry

The following points arise:

• There were obvious risk factors presented by Axel. He had explicitly expressed an interest and intention to commit serious acts of violence. He had carried out physical acts of preparation including the purchase and carrying of weapons. He was, as a young person, constantly accessing graphic content which glorified and normalised violence in his mind, for multiple years since at least 12- 13 years old. This was well-known to Prevent, the police, and other agencies.

• Prevent and Channel are well-resourced agencies. They are able to provide significant support where their threshold is met, including mental health and education intervention. However, access is governed by reference to risk of “extremism” or “terrorism.” Both of these concepts are rooted in whether the risk (of violence) presented is referable to an “ideology” or ideological reason.

• This obsession with “ideology” is linked to post-9/11 counter-terrorism policing. It has, in the past, made it easier to justify policing of communities, rather than based on substantive evidence of risk. Where it applies, ideology is an easy way to categorise people who are “different.” It also provides an illusion of safety, because on the applied logic any terrorist threat is readily identifiable as a person or group with distinct or foreign beliefs. It was and remains a dubious approach to law enforcement and ensuring public safety.

• Not only is a consequence of this that certain communities are unnecessarily over-policed, but, as seen in Axel’s case, obvious risks are ultimately “missed” because they do not fit a preconception of what “extremism” or serious violence should “look like.” This increases the risk to the public.

• The root or motivation for serious violence is frequently complex, linked to social factors, and not rooted in any fixed ideology. This was acknowledged by counter-terrorism policing in their letter to Prevent stakeholders in 2019, which noted that, “for an increasing number of individuals being referred to Prevent, ideological drivers can appear mixed, unclear or unstable (from about 700 referrals in 2016-17 to almost 2,000 in 2017-18). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this group commonly present with multiple and complex vulnerabilities (such as criminality, substance misuse, social isolation and poor mental or emotional health, and so on)...”

• In this context, any attempt to redefine “extremism” or “terrorism” is misplaced. “Terrorism” and “extremism” are inherently political labels. They will always suffer the biases they were designed for. Policing for public safety, including resource allocation to important intervention agencies, must be approached with regard to objective evidence of risk. There is a wealth of evidence on social and health factors that lead to an increased risk of acts of violence. These should be applied, and resource allocation increased for agencies in the community to be able to adequately address anyone who needs help.

• In particular, an area of serious concern is young people having unsupervised access to violent material online, including engaging with adults online who provide additional access to this material. As a society, we have allowed poorly regulated internet service providers and social media companies to proliferate this material. Children are routinely prosecuted under terrorism legislation for accessing or sharing this material. Children have been failed in this respect, at every level. An overhaul is urgently needed.